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National barriers to trade are often varied to insulate 
domestic markets from international price variability, 
especially following a sudden spike. This paper explores 
the extent of that behavior by governments in the 
case of agricultural products, particularly food staples 
whose prices have spiked three times over the past four 
decades. It does so using new annual estimates since 
1955 of agricultural price distortions in 75 countries, 
updated to 2008. Responses by food importers to upward 
price spikes are shown to be as substantial as those by 
food exporters, thereby weakening the domestic price-
stabilizing effect of intervention by exporters. They also 
add to the transfer of welfare to food-surplus from food-
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deficit countries—the opposite of what is usually thought 
of when considering inter-sector trade retaliation. 
Phasing down World Trade Organization-bound import 
tariffs toward their applied rates would help reduce the 
legal opportunities for food-deficit countries to raise their 
import restrictions when international prices slump. To 
date there is no parallel discipline in the World Trade 
Organization that limits increases in export restrictions 
when prices spike upward, however. Bringing such 
discipline through new World Trade Organization rules 
could help alleviate the extent to which government 
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Trade Barrier Volatility and Domestic Price Stabilization: 
Evidence from Agriculture 
 
 
Restrictions on food exports are back in the news. They received much publicity when prices 
in international food markets rose from 2005 and spiked in mid-2008. The rapid rise during 
2007-08 was fueled in part by the news that some developing countries – so as to slow the 
rise in domestic prices –were suspending their grain exports. Agricultural prices came down 
somewhat in the final few months of 2008, but the US dollar price of wheat rose by more 
than half again in the northern summer of 2010, triggered by Russia’s announcement to 
suspend wheat exports in the wake of its drought and wildfires (Figure 1). Ukraine, Belarus, 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan restricted or banned their wheat exports in the latter half of 2010 
too, while India has retained effectively an export ban on both wheat and rice since 2008.  
  Sudden export restrictions evidently can contribute to spikes in international food 
prices. They thus can add to the cost of exogenous supply or demand shocks to food buyers in 
the rest of the world. Typically they are also not in the economic interests of the countries 
imposing them, as there are almost always more-efficient ways to achieve the stated 
objectives of the restriction. The same is true of export subsidies, whose sudden increase in 
the mid-1980s (the so-called EU-North American export subsidy war) was a major 
contributor to the downward price spike then. Moreover, price spikes also prompt food-
deficit countries to alter their import restrictions, which further exacerbates the international 
price spike. This beggar-thy-neighbor behavior of governments is a concern for all trading 
nations because it reduces the stability and predictability of trade opportunities. Left 3 
 
unchecked, it may do so even more in the future if climate change adds to the volatility of 
weather patterns and hence crop yields around the world. 
Ironically, trade policy responses by exporters and importers collectively can render 
national government interventions ineffective in stabilizing domestic prices, while adding to 
international market instability. Furthermore, in the case of upward spikes they increase the 
transfer of welfare from food-deficit to food-surplus countries associated with an exogenous 
shock to world food markets. They may also add to rather than reduce poverty, even though 
many governments claim their interventions are aimed at preventing a rise in poverty.  
This paper first briefly explains how these ironies can come about. The paper then 
compares recent policy responses with how governments responded to the upward price spike 
around 1973-74, and also to the downward spike in international food prices in the mid-
1980s. It does so using new estimates of agricultural price distortions in 75 countries. 
Responses by food importers are shown to be as substantial as those by food exporters, 
ensuring that each group reduced the effectiveness of the other’s domestic price-stabilizing 
intervention effort. The paper concludes by exploring more-effective policy options.  
 
Potential impacts of trade policy responses to international food market shocks 
 
Fluctuations are to be expected in commodity markets subject to periodic supply or demand 
shocks, especially if adverse supply shocks occur when stocks are at low levels (Deaton and 
Laroque 1992). They are even more likely in the presence also of sporadic changes in 
government storage activity. Many governments seek to shield their domestic market 
somewhat from those fluctuations, and especially from severe spikes in international prices, 
by altering the restrictiveness of their trade policies. 4 
 
An export tax or its equivalent lowers the domestic price below the border price of a 
tradable product such as grain (as does an import subsidy), whereas an import tax or its 
equivalent raises its domestic price above the border price (as does an export subsidy). Hence 
it is not surprising that governments, in seeking to protect domestic consumers from an 
upward spike in international food prices, consider a change in trade measures as an 
appropriate response, since that can lower the consumer tax equivalent of any such measure. 
  However, an import tax (or export subsidy) is the equivalent of a consumer tax and a 
producer subsidy, hence lowering it also reduces the extent to which the measure assists 
producers of the product in question. Likewise, since an export tax (or import subsidy) is the 
equivalent of a consumer subsidy and a producer tax, raising it not only helps consumers but 
also harms farmers. If farming is discouraged, the demand for labor on farms falls, and with it 
the wages of unskilled workers in non-farm as well as farm jobs. Thus while poor households 
may benefit on the expenditure side from a measure that reduces the extent to which the price 
of food would otherwise rise, they could be harmed on the earnings side if they are sellers of 
food or suppliers of unskilled labor. Such trade policy responses therefore could add to rather 
than reduce poverty.
1 In the case of small countries unable to influence their terms of trade, 
such trade measures also are likely to reduce national economic welfare, because they distort 
production in addition to lowering the consumer price of food.
2 They are also wasteful if it is 
only poor consumers who need to be helped, since a trade measure affects all food consumers 
in the country. Conversely, in the case of opposite changes to trade measures aimed at 
protecting farmers from a spike downwards in international prices, it is consumers who are 
inadvertently harmed by such policy responses, and all producers rather than just the poorest  
are helped – and in proportion to their output, thereby adding to farm income inequality.  
  Trade measures are not only inefficient at protecting a needy group from being 
harmed by a shock to international food markets, they are also ineffective if many countries 5 
 
respond similarly. The ineffectiveness comes about because trade policies of both food-
exporting and food-importing countries tend to alter in an effort to prevent the transmission 
of the international price shock. If only food-exporting countries respond to an upward price 
spike, the international terms of trade would turn even further in their favor because of the 
additional reduction in available supplies on the international markets (and conversely if only 
food-importing countries alter their trade restrictions when the world price of food collapses); 
and the extent of that extra terms of trade benefit is greater, the larger the proportion of global 
trade so affected by the exporting countries’ policy response. Such action would thus add 
both to the extent of the international price spike and to the transfer of welfare from food-
deficit to food-surplus countries (or from food-surplus to food-deficit countries when the 
price spike is downward and only food-deficit countries respond). 
However, Martin and Anderson (2010) show that when both sets of countries seek to 
insulate their domestic markets from an external shock, their impacts on the international 
price spike are reinforcing but their impacts on the volume they trade internationally – and 
hence on their domestic prices – are offsetting. In the extreme case in which food-deficit 
countries expand their imports to exactly the same extent as food-surplus countries reduce 
exports, the domestic price in both sets of countries would be no different than if neither 
country altered their trade measures following the exogenous shock. That is, the initial 
international price change from the shock would be fully transmitted to both sets of countries, 
despite their efforts to fully insulate their domestic markets in that extreme case. Moreover, 
the more countries participate and thus the more the international price spike is accentuated, 
the more compelled will other countries feel to join the bandwagon and push that price even 
higher.  
  The above insights from standard trade theory raise several empirical questions: How 
much do countries try to dampen international-to-domestic food price transmission in 6 
 
general, and has this tendency lessened since many countries began reducing their trade 
barriers in the 1980s? Are trade restrictions noticeably different in periods of international 
price spikes than in non-spike periods? Do various governments respond differently in 
periods of upward versus downward spikes in international food prices? In particular, do 
developing countries alter their trade interventions more than high-income countries, and are 
food-deficit countries more inclined to vary their trade interventions than food-surplus 
countries? The next section describes a new database capable of addressing these questions, 
and the following section provides a summary of empirical evidence provided by that 
database. 
 
Database on government distortions to domestic prices of farm products  
  
A new World Bank database provides, in a single source, a set of indicators of the extent to 
which export restrictions and other price-distorting trade and domestic policies have altered 
annual average domestic producer and consumer prices of farm products away from their 
international price levels over the past half century (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008, with 
summary estimates in Anderson 2009 and Ch. 2 of Anderson 2010). The sample includes 75 
countries that together account for all but one-tenth of global agriculture, and the 75 most 
important products so as to cover around 70 percent of the gross value of agricultural output 
in each focus country.  
While those estimates only go up to 2007 (and only to 2004 for most developing 
countries), and so do not include the most-recent price-spike period, price data are now 
available for sufficient countries to enable at least a preliminary update of the estimates in 
Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) for rice and wheat. These new estimates are based, for high-
income countries (including those that recently acceded to form the EU-27), on producer 7 
 
support estimates reported in OECD (2010). For developing countries, the updated estimates 
make use of FAO and World Bank data sources for producer and border prices, respectively.
3  
The key indicator used for present purposes is the national nominal rate of assistance 
to agricultural producers (NRA). This is the extent to which the domestic producer price 
exceeds the border price, and hence is negative if farmers receive less than the price at the 
country’s border for a similar product. That is the appropriate indicator in times of 
international price downturns when governments seek to provide more assistance to farmers; 
but it turns out to be very highly correlated with the appropriate indicator in times of upward 
international food price spikes when governments seek to provide more protection to 
consumers, which is the consumer tax equivalent (CTE).
4 The high correlation reflects the 
fact that most interventions in national food markets occur at the border, rather than in the 
form of domestic food consumer or producer subsidies or taxes.  
 
How much do governments insulate their domestic agricultural markets? 
 
Needless to say, governments do not limit their interventions in markets for farm products to 
periods of extreme prices. In the past developing countries have tended to set NRAs below 
zero, especially if they are food-surplus, while high-income countries have tended to assist 
their farmers (NRAs above zero), especially if they are food-deficit. That is, NRAs tend to be 
higher the higher a country’s income per capita and the weaker the country’s agricultural 
comparative advantage. This is evident from the first 3 columns of Table 1, which reports 
regressions of product NRAs in the panel dataset for six key crop products. Those highly 
significant regression coefficients suggest NRAs tend to rise over time as a country’s per 
capita income rises, and more so the more that growth is accompanied by a decline in 
agricultural comparative advantage.  8 
 
Agricultural policy regimes tend also to have an anti-trade bias. In high-income 
countries, that has manifested itself in import restrictions. There have been no substantive 
export restrictions on high-income countries’ farm products since the 1950s and, even where 
export subsidies have been used, they have provided much less assistance to exporters than 
that enjoyed by import-competing farmers of high-income countries. For the developing 
country group, the anti-trade bias manifests itself mostly as taxes and other restrictions on 
agricultural exports, although their impact has declined since the 1980s and there has instead 
been some growth in agricultural import protection by developing countries. This anti-trade 
bias is reflected in the negative coefficient on the dummy variable for exportables in column 
5 of Table 1 (as well as in the anti-trade bias and trade reduction indexes reported in 
Anderson 2009). 
More pertinent to the present paper is the fact that around the long-run trends in 
NRAs for each country there is much fluctuation from year to year in individual product 
NRAs. NRAs are negatively correlated with deviations from trend in the international price 
of the product in question (column 4 of Table 1). Perhaps the most notable case is rice in Asia 
(Figure 2), where the negative coefficient of correlation between the NRA and international 
price is well above 0.5; but, during 1965-2007, it is also above 0.5 globally for cotton, maize, 
pork and sugar, and is 0.41 for wheat (Anderson 2010, Table 2.7). 
This domestic price-insulating behavior by governments is of concern because it 
means there is less international trade in farm products than would be the case otherwise. 
Such ‘thinning’ of international markets for these weather-dependent products in turn makes 
prices and quantities traded more volatile. Using a stochastic model of world food markets, 
Tyers and Anderson (1992, Table 6.14) found that instability of international food prices in 
the early 1980s was three times greater than it would have been under free trade in those 
products. A further simulation exercise by Tyers (1991) suggests that between three-fifths 9 
 
and three-quarters of the global cost of agricultural protection in high-income countries in the 
early 1980s was due to the insulating component of their policies.  
To examine how much that behavior has continued since the early 1980s, we estimate 
the elasticity of transmission of the international product price to the domestic market for key 
farm products. Following Nerlove (1972) and Tyers and Anderson (1992, pp. 65-75), we use 
a geometric distributed lag formulation to estimate elasticities for each key product for all 
focus countries for the period 1985 to 2007. Specifically, we assume that associated with the 
border price Pt there is a ‘target’ domestic price 
*
t p , towards which policy ensures that the 
actual domestic price, pt, moves only sluggishly. Changes in this target price might respond 
incompletely, even in the long run, to corresponding changes in the border price. If all prices 
are expressed in logarithms, the target domestic price then has the following relationship with 
the border price:  
) ( 0 0
* P P p p t LR t                    (1) 
where  LR  is the long-run price transmission elasticity and the values of p0 and P0 are the 
domestic and border prices in the base period. In the short-run, the inflation-deflated 
domestic price adjusts only partially to any change in the target domestic price:  
) ( 1
*
1      t t t t p p p p         ( 2 )  
where the parameter δ gives the fraction of the ultimate adjustment that takes place in one 
year. By substituting (1) into (2) to eliminate the unobservable target price, the following 
reduced form, which is suitable for fitting to data, is obtained:  
t LR t LR t P p P p p          1 0 0 ) 1 ( ) (      =   a + b pt-1 + c Pt        (3) 10 
 
where, again, if the prices are expressed in logarithms, the short-run (one year) elasticity of 
price transmission is simply δ times the long-run elasticity. Thus the short-run elasticity 
estimate is the regression coefficient c and the long-run elasticity estimate is c/(1-b). If the 
policy objective was to hold the level of protection constant on average over time but to 
stabilize the domestic price around the trend border price,  SR  would be less than one and  LR 
would be one. But in general even  LR  could be less than one, for example if the government 
sought to raise the trend level of agricultural protection as per capita income grew (as 
suggested by the first two columns of Table 1). 
Table 2 summarizes the estimates. The average of estimates for the short-run 
elasticity range from a low of 0.3 for sugar to around 0.5 for rice, wheat and pork, not quite 
0.6 for cotton, cocoa, maize and poultry, and around 0.7 for beef, soybean and coffee. The 
unweighted average across all of those key products is 0.54, suggesting that within one year, 
little more than half the movement in international prices of those farm products has been 
transmitted domestically on average over the past quarter century. Even the long-run 
elasticity appears well short of unity after full adjustment: the average of the elasticities for 
those eleven products across the 75 sample countries is just 0.69 (last row of Table 2). 
The tendency for each country to alter its individual product NRAs from year to year 
around their long-run trend does not appear to have diminished since trade-related policy 
reforms began in the mid-1980s. In Table 3 we focus on the NRA’s annual average deviation 
from trend in the two decades before and after 1985. The average deviation from trend NRA 
is more than one-tenth higher in the latter two decades than in the earlier two decades in just 
as many cases as it is more than one-tenth lower, suggesting no major difference between the 
two periods for these products on average. Nor is there much difference as between 
developing and high-income countries. Notice too that the deviations are non-trivial: except 11 
 
for rice in high-income countries, the average deviation is well above the mean NRA for each 
product (which is reported in the right-hand half of Table 3). 
 
How different are NRAs in periods of international price spikes? 
 
We move now to a closer examination of periods of extreme spikes in international food 
prices. The only such periods prior to 2008 in the World Bank’s distortions database are those 
around 1974 (an upward price spike) and in 1986 (a downward price spike). In Table 4 we 
focus on the annual average nominal assistance coefficient
5 (NAC = 1 + NRA/100) in the 
spike year plus the two years each side of it, relative to the longer period either side of each 
spike period. The expectation is that the NAC would be lower in the upward spike periods 
than in the average of the two adjoining longer non-spike periods, and conversely for the 
downward spike period around 1986. That is indeed what is evident in Table 4, where the 
spike periods are shown in bold italics and the percentage change in their average NACs from 
the prior non-spike period are shown in the lower half of the table. 
Looking more closely at rice and wheat, for which new NAC estimates are available 
for the period since 2004 when their international prices were gradually rising before spiking 
in mid-2008, they too are lower than in the preceding 1988-2004 non-spike period. The 
proportional extent to which the rice and wheat NACs were lowered is greater in the recent 
period than in the 1970s’ spike period. That difference may be even greater once estimates 
are available for the two years following the 2008 spike instead of having to use, as a 
substitute, estimates for 2004 and 2005 when international rice and wheat prices were lower 
(see Figure 1). 
Also provided in Table 4 is a breakdown of rice and wheat countries into import-
competing and exporting country sub-sets. The same down-up-down pattern is present for 12 
 
each of those two country sub-sets as for the total set. The changes in the NACs in each spike 
period from its prior non-spike period are not obviously higher or lower for exporting as 
compared with importing countries, suggesting both types of countries are actively engaged 
in altering their interventions at their national border when international food prices spike. 
Historically, governments in developing countries have tended to discriminate against 
farmers and in favor of food consumers whereas in high-income countries they have tended 
to do the opposite (Anderson 2009). That suggests in developing countries consumers are 
more likely to be protected from an upward price spike than producers would be from a 
downward spike in international prices, and conversely in high-income countries. Assuming 
the CTE is the same as the NRA (that is, only border distortions matter), that in turn might 
lead one to expect the percentage change in the NAC to be less for developing countries and 
more for high-income countries in the 1980s downturn period than in the upward spike 
periods. That indeed is what is shown for all but one of the eleven cases reported in the 
bottom part of Table 4 for high-income countries, and is clear for the cases of rice and wheat 
illustrated in Figure 3(a). However, it is true for barely half of the developing country cases 
shown in Table 3(b) – although when the developing country group was subdivided into low- 
and middle-income countries, the expected result for rice and wheat held true for three-
quarters of the cases. 
Such comparisons of period averages are blunt, however, because the averages hide a 
lot of year-to-year variation. A more-precise picture of the annual changes in the first half of 
the price spike periods can be seen in Table 5. It shows that the decline in NACs was more 
gradual in the recent price surge period than in the 1970s when all the change for wheat was 
in 1973 and for rice (whose harvest dates are less concentrated around the end of the year 
than are those for wheat) was in 1973 and 1974. Because of that faster change in the 1970s, 
the magnitude of the annual NAC changes was greater then than in the recent period to 2008. 13 
 
The rice NACs over the 1972-74 period fell by more than two-fifths for both high-
income and developing countries. The NAC falls for wheat were not as severe as for rice, but 
were still substantial at more than one-quarter for high-income countries and nearly one-third 
for developing countries. The extent of annual decline in the NACs in the most recent price 
spike is slightly less than in the 1970s except for high-income wheat, and not quite as rapid: 
between 2005 and 2008 the NAC for rice fell 29 percent for high-income countries and 36 
percent for developing countries, and for wheat it fell around 37 percent for both high-income 
and developing countries (Table 5). That slightly smaller and slower decline also is consistent 
with the fact that there were smaller and slower proportionate rises in the international prices 
of those cereals in 2005-08 than in the early 1970s. 
Turning to all covered farm products (bottom segment of Table 5), the NAC for 
developing countries fell by 16 percent in the first two years before rising by half that amount 
in the subsequent two years of the 1970s’ spike period. The fall for high-income countries 
was almost the same (14 percent) but it more than recovered in the subsequent two years. As 
for the mid-1980s price slump period, the NAC rise for all farm products was larger for high-
income countries and smaller for developing countries in1984-86 than the fall in 1972-74, 
consistent with the findings discussed above from Table 4(b) and Figure 3(a).  
Table 6 allows an easy comparison between the mid-1980s, and the two upward price 
spike periods, of annual price changes in NACs. It also suggests there is little difference not 
only in the magnitude but also in the timing of the responses of food-importing and food-
exporting countries. That is the case not only for rice and wheat (illustrated in figure 3(b)) but 
also for all products included in the World Bank’s database, shown at the bottom of Table 6.  
In Table 7 the NRAs have been decomposed into the various border and domestic 
measures for developing and high-income countries, for all products covered by the World 
Bank’s database, following the methodology in Croser and Anderson (2010). The annual 14 
 
estimates are shown for the upward spike period of 1972-76 and the downward spike period 
of 1984-88. Export restrictions were the dominant instrument for developing countries in 
both those periods, becoming more and then less important in the upward spike period of 
1972-76 (when import tariffs were lowered and then raised), and conversely in the downward 
spike period of 1984-88. In high-income countries there are virtually no taxes or other 
restrictions on exports, but the component of their NRAs due to export subsidies, as one 
would expect, have followed the same path as dominant import tariffs over those spike 
periods: U-shaped during the upward spike, inverted U-shaped in the downward spike. The 
bolded rows of Table 7 (showing the NRAs from border measures and the aggregate NRAs 
which include also domestic producer taxes and subsidies) reveal that border measures 
account for the vast majority of the distortions to producer prices in both sets of countries. 
Finally, in Table 8 the decomposition by instrument for those two previous spike 
periods is reported in terms of welfare and trade reduction indexes (WRIs and TRIs), again 
following the methodology in Croser and Anderson (2010). It reveals that those indexes, after 
tracing a U-shape or inverted U-shape during a spike period, tend to return to the pre-spike 
period average within two years after the peak of the spike. 
 
Summary and policy implications 
 
The above empirical findings can be summarized as follows: 
  Product NRAs are significantly negatively correlated with fluctuations around trend in 
the product’s international price. 
  On average, little more than half the movement in international food prices is 
transmitted to domestic markets within the first year. 15 
 
  That insulation tendency appears to be no less in the two decades following the trade-
related policy reforms that began in the mid-1980s than it was in the previous two 
decades. 
  NACs were substantially lower in the two upward price spike periods than in adjacent 
non-spike periods, and higher for the downward price spike period around 1986, with 
both export and import measures contributing to that finding. 
  The extent and speed of the annual NAC changes during an upward price spike was 
greater in the early 1970s than in the recent period to 2008, consistent with the fact 
that international food prices rose proportionately less per year in the latter period. 
  The extent and speed of NAC changes in each spike period are similar for food-
exporting and food-importing countries, suggesting both types of countries actively 
insulate their domestic market from international food prices spikes. 
  The percentage change in the NAC was less for developing countries and more for 
high-income countries in the mid-1980s’ downward price-spike period than in the two 
upward spike periods, suggesting that in developing countries consumers are more 
likely to be protected from an upward price spike than producers would be from a 
downward price spike, and conversely in high-income countries. 
True, the above findings are based in part on distortion estimates for the most-recent 
food price spike that are preliminary and cover just border measures for the two main food 
staples. However, the behavior of policy makers indicated by those estimates is so similar to 
that indicated by past responses to price spikes that tentative policy implications can be 
drawn with reasonable confidence, pending the availability of a more-comprehensive update 
of distortion estimates. 
Trade policy interventions are varied in response to international food price spikes to 
achieve various stated or hidden objectives of governments. The most commonly stated one 16 
 
in developing countries in the case of upward price spikes is to ensure domestic food security 
for consumers, that is, to have adequate supplies at affordable prices for all domestic 
households. Related stated objectives are to reduce inflationary or balance of payments 
pressures from an upward price spike, but those concerns could be better handled via 
monetary or exchange rate policies, respectively. As for downward price spikes, the 
commonly stated objective of altering a country’s trade barriers is to protect poor farmers 
from income losses. 
An unstated motive may be to extract a higher price from the international market 
while there are shortages, by improving the terms of trade further through restricting exports. 
This assumes a country faces a sufficiently inelastic demand for its exportable surplus (and 
that of any allies with whom it can cartelize, as Russia managed to do for wheat in the latter 
half of 2010) such that the reduced quantity exported is more than compensated for by the 
further rise in the price of those exports. However, most countries have little or no such 
market power even in the short run. Even if they did have some power, and sought to use it 
during a period of rising prices, they would alienate long-time customers who may 
permanently turn to other suppliers or raise support to their own producers – which ultimately 
may be more costly than the short term gains it might bring them (recall the US embargo on 
soybean exports in1973 and the strength that gave to the arguments of agricultural 
protectionists in Japan). In any case, even the short-term potential benefit is foregone if an 
export ban, rather than partial restriction, is used. Nor can this motive apply to food-
importing countries that lower their import tariff or introduce an import subsidy in response 
to a rise in the international price. On the contrary, their reaction turns the terms of trade 
against themselves. For that reason it might be expected that food-exporting countries are 
more likely to respond to upward price spikes than food-importing countries – were it not for 
the fact that most countries on their own have little or no scope to be net beneficiaries from 17 
 
such action. For equal and opposite reasons, food-importing countries might be expected to 
respond to downward price spikes, by raising their tariffs, more than food-exporting countries 
who would be inclined to lower their export taxes/raise their export subsidies – but again the 
small-country caveat applies, which may be why these tendencies do not appear in the 
estimates summarized above.  
Corden (1997, pp. 72-76) suggests the pattern of intermittent border interventions, 
aimed at lowering the hurt to those adversely affected by an external shock even though it 
harms those helped by the shock and the overall economy, implies a conservative social 
welfare function. A more formal model of loss-averting reactions of governments, based on 
utility theory, has been developed by Freund and Özden (2008), building on the pioneering 
lobbying model of Grossman and Helpman (1994).
6 Helpful though this may be in explaining 
why governments intervene, more work is needed to explain why governments attempt to 
provide loss-averting assistance by varying their trade restrictions rather than via more-direct 
and thus more efficient domestic policy instruments such as targeted income supplements to 
only the most vulnerable households and only while the price spike lasts.
7  
  Traditional national government trade policy reactions to food price spikes are 
undesirable also because, collectively, they are not very effective in stabilizing domestic 
prices, and not least because they add to international price instability: they reduce the role 
that trade between nations can play in bringing stability to the world’s food markets. The 
larger the number of countries insulating their domestic markets, the more other countries 
perceive a need to do likewise, exacerbating the effect on world prices such that even greater 
changes in trade barriers are desired by each nation – both exporters and importers. They also 
transfer welfare between food-surplus and food-deficit countries, and may even add to rather 
than reduce poverty.  18 
 
Clearly there is scope for governments to multilaterally agree to stop intermittently 
intervening in these ways. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the most obvious place 
to seek restraints on variable trade restrictions. Indeed one of the original motivations for the 
Contracting Parties to sign the GATT (WTO’s predecessor) was to bring stability and 
predictability to world trade. To date the membership has adopted rules to encourage the use 
of trade taxes in place of quantitative restrictions on trade (Article IX of the GATT), and has 
managed to obtain binding commitments on import tariffs and on production and export 
subsidies as part of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. However, those bindings 
have been set well above applied rates by most countries, leaving great scope for varying 
them without dishonoring those legal commitments.  
In the current Doha round of WTO negotiations there are proposals to phase out 
agricultural export subsidies as well as to bring down import tariff bindings, both of which 
would contribute to global economic welfare and more-stable international prices for farm 
products. At the same time, however, developing countries have added to the WTO’s Doha 
agenda a proposal for a Special Safeguards Mechanism (SSM) that would allow those 
countries to raise their import barriers above their bindings for a significant proportion of 
agricultural products in the event of a sudden international price rise or an import surge. This 
is exactly the opposite of what is needed by way of a global public good to reduce the 
frequency and amplitude of food price spikes (Hertel, Martin and Leister 2010).  
Moreover, proposals to broaden the Doha agenda to also introduce disciplines on 
export restraints have struggled to date to gain traction.
8 This reflects the facts that 
traditionally the demandeurs in WTO negotiations have been dominated by interests seeking 
market access, and that upward price spikes are infrequent. Yet the above analysis reveals the 
need for symmetry of treatment of export and import disciplines.  19 
 
Could greater supply assurances from food-surplus countries, in the form of stronger 
disciplines on export restrictions, provide a Doha breakthrough? Potentially it could reduce 
the need for an SSM, which has been one of the more contentious issues in the Doha talks 
and the one that triggered their suspension in mid-2008. But more than that, it could reduce 
the concerns food-deficit countries have over relying on food imports in general, thereby 
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Figure 1: International prices for rice and wheat, 2004 to September 2010 
 




























































































































Figure 2: Rice NRAs and international rice price, South and Southeast Asia, 1970 to 2008 
(left axis is int’l price in current US dollars, right axis is weighted average NRA in percent) 
 (a) South Asia 
 
Note: Correlation coefficient is -0.70. Countries included are Bangladesh (except for 1970-
73), India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  
 
(b) Southeast Asia 
 
Note: Correlation coefficient is -0.57. Countries included are Indonesia (except for 1970-74), 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (except for 1970-85 and 2005-08).  
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Figure 3: Changes in nominal assistance coefficients for rice and wheat,
a high-income and developing countries, and world exporters and world 
importers, 1972-74, 1984-86, and 2005-08 
(percentage changes) 
(a) High-income and developing countries 
                     
(b) World exporters and world importers 
   












































Table 1: Regressions aimed at understanding variations in product NRAs across 75 countries, 
1955 to 2007 
(no country fixed effects) 
 
  
Log of real 
GDP per 
capita 







 % deviation 













Rice -2.022***  0.157***  -0.390***  -0.320***  -0.732***  5.988***  1281  0.514 
(0.152)  (0.00988)  (0.0219) (0.0532) (0.0447)  (0.562) 
 
Wheat -0.921***  0.0707***  -0.158***  -0.317***  -0.424***  2.823***  1661  0.347 
(0.116)  (0.00728)  (0.0159) (0.0529) (0.0368)  (0.454) 
 
Maize -0.432***  0.0334***  -0.167***  -0.236***  -0.195***  1.307***  1525  0.208 
(0.0937)  (0.00602)  (0.0145) (0.0504) (0.0292)  (0.354) 
 
Soybean 0.957*** -0.0424**  -0.548***  -0.0372  -0.128 
-
5.229*** 703  0.310 
(0.345) (0.0212)  (0.0368)  (0.155) (0.0893) (1.366) 
 
Sugar -1.021***  0.0843***  -0.244***  -0.582***  -0.414***  3.180***  1648  0.413 
(0.178) (0.0113)  (0.0255) (0.0338) (0.0554)  (0.670) 
 
Cotton -0.370***  0.0320***  0.00829 -0.274***  -0.270***  1.057***  883 0.275 
(0.0897)  (0.00607)  (0.0159) (0.0363) (0.0429)  (0.315) 
 
*** indicates statistically significant at the 1% level 
Source: Authors’ revision of Table 2.14 in Anderson (2010).    26 
 
Table 2: Global average price transmission elasticities, key agricultural products, 75 focus 
countries, 1985 to 2004 



















11 products  0.54 0.69
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on NRAs from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
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Table 3: Deviation of national NRA around its trend value,
a key farm products,
b developing 
and high-income countries, 1965–84 and 1985–2004  
  Deviation of national NRAs around trend
a  Weighted average of NRAs (%) 
  Developing countries  High-income countries  Developing countries  High-income countries 
    1965–84 1985–04 1965–84 1985–04 1965–84 1985–04 1965–84 1985–04 
Rice  32 64 66  229  -20.1  1.9  136.8  419.3 
Wheat  33 47 80 91 5.5  10.0  16.1  29.3 
Maize  36 33 53 58  -3.4  0.6  7.5  13.9 
Soybean  46 117 75  61  2.7 -1.2 0.1 6.6 
Sugar  53 66  179  173  17.2  15.5  106.5  141.2 
Cotton  38 33 42 28  -16.0  -12.5  33.1  32.2 
Coconut  22 20 na na  -11.5  -20.8  na na 
Coffee  41 27 na na  -37.3  -12.2  na na 
Beef  45 52  128  127  -12.4  2.7  22.3  47.0 
Pork  81 60 92 77  23.6  -7.5  35.6  14.7 
Poultry  109  74  164  197 26.3 12.3 24.0 25.8 
 
a Deviation, measured in NRA percentage points, is computed as the absolute value of 
(residual – trend NRA) where national trend NRA in each of the two sub-periods is 
obtained by ordinary least squares linear regression of the national NRA on time. Estimates 
shown are an unweighted average of national NRA deviations each year, averaged over the 
number of years in each period. 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on NRAs from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 28 
 
Table 4: Average annual NACs
a and percentage changes in them, key crops, developing and high-income countries, 1965 to 2008 
(1 + NRA/100) 
(a) Average annual NACs (1 + NRA/100) 



























Rice   0.97  0.91  1.02 1.27 1.30 1.20 1.23 1.07 1.37 2.53 2.31 1.87
Importers 1.06  0.99  1.09 1.35 1.35 1.23 1.85 1.70 2.28 5.78 6.99 3.47
Exporters 0.76  0.65  0.78 1.02 1.16 0.91 0.99 0.81 1.01 1.89 1.53 1.02
      
Wheat   1.10  0.90  1.10 1.18 1.19 1.00 1.39 0.92 1.41 2.00 1.58 1.41
Importers 1.01  0.94  1.24 1.36 0.91 0.71 1.20 0.97 1.08 1.46 1.27 1.02
Exporters 1.12  0.89  1.09 1.18 1.22 1.05 1.45 0.91 1.50 2.18 2.05 1.87
      
Maize   1.09  0.99  1.03 1.13 1.07 na 1.38 1.21 1.37 1.62 1.42 na
Soybean   1.20  0.99  1.19 1.27 1.42 na 0.97 1.00 1.45 1.90 1.22 na
Sugar   1.39  0.78  1.10 1.49 1.37 na 2.95 1.17 2.19 3.29 2.58 na
    
(b) Percentage change in NAC from previous non-spike period 
  1972-1976 1984-1988 2004-2008 1972-1976 1984-1988 2004-2008
  
Rice importers  -7  24 -9 -8 154 -50
Rice exporters  -14  31 -22 -18 87 -33
Wheat importers  -7  10 -22 -19 35 -20
Wheat exporters  -21  8 -14 -37 45 -9
Maize   -9  10 na -12 18 na
Soybean   -18  7 na 3 31 na
Sugar   -44  35 na -60 50 na
 
a Unweighted average of national NACs each year, averaged over the number of years in each period. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on updated NRA estimates from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 29 
 
Table 5: Annual NACs for rice, wheat and all farm products, by country group, 1972 to 2008 
 
(1 + NRA/100) 
(a) Rice 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 2005 2006 2007 2008
World exporters  0.87 0.62 0.56 0.73 0.88 1.11 1.31 1.52 1.69 1.58 1.05 0.97 1.05 0.75
World importers  1.37 1.03 0.75 1.07 1.17 1.45 1.61 1.62 1.64 1.49 1.51 1.47 1.52 1.07
High-income countries  1.29 0.95 0.77 1.07 1.26 1.70 2.09 2.82 3.17 2.85 2.27 1.89 1.70 1.61
Developing  countries 1.11 0.83 0.64 0.91 1.03 1.24 1.37 1.28 1.29 1.15 1.27 1.24 1.34 0.81
   Asia   1.15  0.84  0.58 0.89 1.02 1.26 1.42 1.35 1.46  1.25 1.30 1.22 1.28 0.74
   Africa  1.10  0.84  0.66 0.99 1.06 1.21 1.17 1.16 1.29  1.12 1.06 1.15 1.36 0.79
   Latin America  1.05  0.81  0.75 0.82 0.96 1.27 1.65 1.34 0.90  0.96 1.44 1.35 1.44 0.94
(b) Wheat 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 2005 2006 2007 2008
World exporters  1.14 0.88 0.83 0.97 0.98 1.17 1.19 1.71 1.70 1.41 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.86
World importers  1.09 0.73 0.76 0.96 0.94 1.29 1.46 1.74 2.04 1.79 1.50 1.43 1.14 0.97
High-income countries  1.11 0.82 0.80 0.93 0.94 1.47 1.71 2.17 2.51 2.13 1.86 1.70 1.19 1.16
Developing  countries 1.10 0.72 0.74 1.01 0.95 1.06 1.09 1.22 1.33 1.20 1.07 1.00 0.98 0.80
   Asia   1.35  0.80  0.89 1.21 1.01 1.20 1.20 1.28  1.42  1.46 1.08 1.00  0.92 0.59
   Africa  0.99  0.73  0.64 0.87 0.84 0.92 0.91 1.20  1.38  1.11 1.13 0.99  1.10 0.92
   Latin America  1.02  0.63  0.72 0.96 1.07 1.14 1.27 1.20  1.16  1.09 1.01 1.02  0.93 0.84
(c)  All covered farm products 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
World exporters  0.94 0.83 0.80 0.87 0.80 0.86 0.99 1.16 1.15 1.04
World importers  1.49 1.30 1.22 1.40 1.58 1.73 1.89 2.05 2.22 1.88
High-income countries  1.46 1.34 1.26 1.40 1.62 1.81 1.96 2.25 2.44 2.04
Developing  countries 1.02 0.88 0.86 0.95 0.93 0.99 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.05
   Asia   1.30  1.04  0.98 1.09 1.16 1.29 1.45 1.46  1.42  1.36
   Africa  0.90  0.80  0.78 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.85 0.90  0.97  0.91
   Latin America  1.01  0.92  0.92 1.08 1.06 1.10 1.28 1.16  1.03  0.99
a Unweighted average of national NACs. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on updated NRA estimates from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
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Table 6: Annual changes in NACs, by country group, 1972-74, 1984-86, and 2005-08 
(percent) 
(a) Rice 
1972/73 1973/74  1984/85  1985/86 2005/06 2006/07  2007/08 
World exporters  -29 -10 18 16 -7 8 -29
World importers  -24 -27 11 1 -3 3 -30
High-income countries  -26 -19 23 35 -17 -10  -5
Developing countries  -25 -23 10 -7 -3 8  -40
 
(b) Wheat 
1972/73 1973/74  1984/85  1985/86 2005/06 2006/07  2007/08 
World exporters  - 2 2- 6 2 4 3 5- 5  - 5
World importers  -33 4 14 19 -5 -21 -14
High-income countries  -26 -2 17 27 -8 -30  -3
Developing countries  -34 3 3 12 -6 -3  -19
 
(c) All farm products 
1972/73 1973/74  1984/85  1985/86 
World exporters  -12 -3 15 17
World importers  -13 -6 9 8
High-income countries  -8 -6 8 15
Developing countries  -13 -3 10 1
 
a Unweighted averages of national NACs changes. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on updated NRA estimates from Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008). 31 
 
Table 7: Contributions to total agricultural NRA
a from different policy instruments, developing and high-income countries, 1972-76 and 1984-88 
 
(percent) 
(a) Developing countries 
  1972 1973 1974 1975 1976   1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Border measures   
Import tax equivalent  22 2 2 8 6   7 7 8 9 8
Export subsidies  4 0 0 1 1   1 1 1 1 1
Export tax equivalent  -26 -18 -24 -22 -9   -20 -10 -14 -19 -22
Import subsidy equivalent  -6 -5 -5 -2 -1   -1 -1 -1 -1 -2
ALL BORDER MEASURES  -22 -21 -28 -16 -4  -14 -3 -6 -11 -15
   
TOTAL NRA(incl. domestic measures) 3 -14 -29 -17 -2   -15 -2 -5 -9 -13
 
(b) High-income countries 
  1972 1973 1974 1975 1976   1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Border measures   
Import tax equivalent  25 18 15 21 30   33 34 50 49 42
Export subsidies  4 2 1 2 2   2 4 7 7 5
Export tax equivalent  0 -1 0 0 0   0 -1 0 0 0
Import subsidy equivalent  -1 -3 -3 -1 -1   0 0 0 0 0
ALL BORDER MEASURES  27 17 13 22 31  35 37 57 56 46
   
TOTAL NRA(incl. domestic measures) 29 18 13 24 32   46 52 70 69 59
 
a All entries have been generated by dividing the producer subsidy equivalent of all (including domestic price, non-product-specific and 
‘decoupled’) measures by the total agricultural sector’s gross production valued at undistorted prices.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRA estimates from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 32 
 
 
Table 8: Contributions to total agricultural welfare and trade reduction indexes (WRIs and TRIs) from different policy instruments, developing and high-
income countries, 1965-2004 
(percent) 
       (a) WRI 
Developing countries 
1965-71 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977-83 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
1989- 
2004
Import tax equivalent  12 15 4 3 11 13 12  12 17 18 17 13 11
Export tax equivalent  19 16 31 34 28 18 23  30 22 28 33 32 10
I m p o r t  s u b s i d y  e q u i v a l e n t   3 48732 4   22122 2
All (incl. domestic) measures  38 42 47 55 53 38 51  60 46 53 58 51 29
 
High-income countries 
Import tax equivalent  48 39 25 24 37 53 58  61 64 86 99 73 51
E x p o r t  s u b s i d i e s   7 63133 4   47 1 1 1 18 5






1965-71 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977-83 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
1989- 
2004
Import tax equivalent  9 13 3 2 10 11 9  10 13 14 15 11 9
Export tax equivalent  19 15 29 32 26 17 22  28 20 26 32 30 9
Import subsidy equivalent  -3 -3 -8 -7 -3 -2 -4  -2 -2 -1 -2 -2 -2
All (incl. domestic) measures  25 22 20 28 37 25 27  39 32 38 45 39 15
 
High-income countries 
Import tax equivalent  34 29 20 17 24 35 37  40 41 60 60 51 35
Export subsidies  -4 -4 -2 -1 -2 -2 -3  -3 -5 -8 -8 -6 -3
All (incl. domestic) measures  29 24 16 12 22 32 33  37 37 53 53 47 32
 




1 Recent empirical studies provide numerous cases of where trade restrictions have added to 
or would add to poverty. See, for example, Hertel and Winters (2006), Anderson, Cockburn 
and Martin (2010) and Aksoy and Hoekman (2010).  
2 Variable trade restrictions can also affect long-term investments and hence economic 
growth rates. Drawing on a broad range of developing country case studies, Bevan Collier 
and Gunning (1990) and Collier, Gunning and Associates (1999) suggest that faster economic 
growth would result from allowing producers access to high prices in those rare occasions 
when they spike, rather than taxing it away. According to the evidence in their case studies, 
this is because governments are more prone than farm households to squander the windfall 
either in poor investments or in extra consumption. 
3 The new developing country estimates are less reliable than the high-income country ones, 
and the earlier estimates for developing countries in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), for 
several reasons. One is that, to do the update promptly, producer prices reported to FAO had 
to be used for developing countries rather than more-nuanced prices available only in 
national statistical agencies. To minimize the errors this might introduce, the FAO producer 
prices in US current dollars were converted into an index set at 100 for 2004, and the 2004 
prices in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) were updated using the changes in that index for 
each country through to 2008. Likewise, to overcome delays in obtaining export and import 
volumes and values, from which border prices could be derived, the authors simply used the 
Thailand 5% broken rice and Canadian wheat prices (from World Bank 2010) to create 
indexes set at 100 for 2004 for those international reference prices, and the 2004 border 
prices in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) were updated using the changes in each of those 
indexes through to 2008. The coefficients of correlation between those international reference 34 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
prices and the border prices used for each of the developing countries in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) over the period 1970-2004 are 0.58 for wheat and 0.69 for rice. 
4 The coefficient of correlation between the NRA and CTE for the 75 countries and products 
over the five decades covered by Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) is 0.93. 
5 The NAC is more appropriate than the NRA for getting a sense of the proportional change 
over time in the degree of distortion, especially when some NRAs are negative (which just 
means the NAC is below rather than above one). The national NACs are averaged across 
countries without using weights, so that each polity is treated as an equally interesting case. 
The estimates therefore differ from those reported for country groups in Anderson (2009 and 
2010), where production weights are used to calculate NRA averages (and consumption 
weights for CTE averages). 
6 See also Thompson et al. (2004), Tovar (2009) and Martin and Anderson (2010). An 
additional justification sometimes given for such price-stabilizing intervention in poor 
countries is that credit markets are underdeveloped, or inefficient because of local monopoly 
lenders, so low-income consumers and producers have difficulty smoothing their 
consumption over time as prices fluctuate. In that case the frist-best policy response would be 
to improve the credit market.  
7 Even if the policy objective was explicitly to reduce food import dependence, Nettle, 
Britten-Jones and Anderson (1987) show that trade policy alone is second best to an import 
tariff plus a tariff-funded production subsidy. But since this is just one of many situations in 
which an economic change disadvantages some households, there is a strong case for 
developing better social safety net policies that can offset the adverse impacts of a wide range 
of different shocks on poor people – net sellers as well as net buyers of food – without 
imposing the costly by-product distortions that necessarily accompany n





8 A proposal by Japan in 2000, for example, involved disciplines similar to those on the 
import side, with export restrictions to be replaced by taxes and export taxes to be bound. A 
year later Jordan proposed even stronger rules: a ban on export restrictions and (as proposed 
for export subsidies) the binding of all export taxes at zero.  